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scale, natural resource and human investment variables, only human investment are 
significant; (b) WTO membership has had a positive total effect on regional 
specialization of China’s agricultural production; (c) Regions that produce a larger 
portion of exportable products have become more specialized since entering WTO; (d) 






FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE REGIONAL 







Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 














    Professor Kenneth E. McConnell 
    Professor Lars Olson 



































TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Figures………………………………………………………………………...iii 
 




I   Introduction and Literature………………………………………………………...1 
 
II  Analysis of Changes……………………………………………………………….3 
  2.1  1980’s…………………………………………………………………………..3 
  2.2  1990-2000……………………………………………………………………...5 
  2.3  Post 2001…………………………………………………………………… …7 
 
III  Data and Preliminary Results…………………………………………………......9 
 
IV  Empirical Analysis……………………………………………………………....15 
  4.1  Model Setup…………………………………………………………………..15 
  4.2  Hypotheses to Test…………………………………………………………....16 
  4.3  Analysis of Results……………………………………………………………19 
 





















LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Road an Railway Development in China……………………………………5 
 
Figure 2: Price Indexes for Agricultural Products Purchase Price in China…………..6 
 






LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Tariff rates and quota levels for TRQ commodities (percent)………………..8 
 
Table 2: Index of Regional Specialization, 1985…………………………………….12 
 
Table 3: Index of Regional Specialization, 1990…………………………………….12 
 
Table 4: Index of Regional Specialization, 1995…………………………………….12 
 
Table 5: Index of Regional Specialization, 2000…………………………………….12 
 
Table 6: Index of Regional Specialization, 2006…………………………………….12 
 
Table 7: Average Regional Specialization in South and North………………………13 
 
Table 8: Natural, Capital and Human Resource in Each Region for Selected Years...14 
 
Table 9: Percentage of Exportable Goods Produced in Each Region………………..15 
 
Table 10: Estimate Results for the Linear Model…………………………………….18 
 
Table 11: Estimate Results for the Log Model……………………………………….19 
 












    This author wishes to thank all who have aided in one way or another in the writing 
of this thesis, especially professor Kenneth McConnell, Professor Lars Olson and 
Professor Ramón López, who generously offered suggestions that greatly improved the 
quality of the paper. The author had pleasure talking with colleagues in the department 
on the thesis, and thanks them for their help and encouragement.  
     
    The author would like to show the greatest appreciation to his parents, without 
whom he could never been in this world and never got such good opportunity of 
education. But most of all a loving thank you to his fiancée, Yinghui Zheng, for her 




I. Introduction and Literature 
Regional specialization is often used by economists to measure the degree of free trade 
or the economic openness of a country. Why do we care about regional specialization? 
The prevailing wisdom is that the two main reasons for trade are comparative 
advantage and increasing returns. Comparative advantage means that trade exists 
because different geographical places take advantage of inherent differences to 
maximize production in a narrow area of expertise. Increasing returns says that, trade 
arises to take advantage of scale and variety gains from specialization. Both these two 
reasons mean that there is a relationship between trade and the regional structure of 
production. Therefore, studying regional specialization in production enables us to 
evaluate if a country or a region is taking full advantage of their comparative advantage 
and increasing returns of production. That is, it allows us to investigate whether a 
country or region is realizing its full potential gain from trade. Furthermore, 
understanding the determinants of regional specialization enables people to effectively 
influence the regional structure of production by affecting the determinant factors. In 
this way, the government would be able to design policy improvements for both trade 
and production. 
 
There is no theoretical basis for a certain relationship between freer international trade 
and the regional specialization within a country. Therefore the question needs to be 
answered, case by case, with empirical analysis. In the case of China, there would be 
one major reason, the distinct natural condition in different areas of the country, for 
people to expect that agriculture production in China be relatively more specialized. 
Agricultural production usually relies significantly on the natural characteristics of an 
area, especially in less developed countries. China is one of the world’s largest 
developing countries in terms of geographical territory. As a result, conditions such as 
climate, topography, precipitation and soil vary dramatically among different regions 
in China. However, empirical studies of regional specialization in China’s agricultural 
production have arrived at different conclusions. 
 
In Carter and Zhong (1991), it is claimed that past Chinese governmental policies 
resulted in low levels of differentiation between the agricultural productions of 
China’s various regions. The authors argue that the major reason is central regulation, 
and provide empirical evidences to support their argument that deregulation of the 
market would lead to increased regional specialization. Carter and Lohmar (2002) 
examine the extent of regional specialization in agriculture in China and identified 
trends in specialization from 1981 to 1999. The index of regional specialization for 
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China’s agricultural production for 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996 and 1999 are found to be 
1.08, 1.11, 1.10, 0.93 and 0.91. It means that regional specialization in 1999 is less 
than that in 1981, suggesting an overall shift towards despecialization. No satisfactory 
reason for such a seemingly contradictory trend was provided in this paper. The 
authors predicted that WTO membership would have a significant impact on the 
structural transformation of China’s agriculture.  
 
It is not impossible to find an explanation for despecialization in China. Pingali and 
Rosegrant (1995) claims that specialization in agricultural production is accompanied 
by economic growth, urbanization and withdrawal of labor from the agricultural 
sector. It may be the withdrawal of labor that explains the apparent contradiction 
between China’s development and its decrease in regional specialization. As is well 
known, China has the world’s largest population, a large part of which is working in 
the agricultural sector. A withdrawal of labor from agriculture could result in serious 
consequences, such as an increased rate of unemployment or mass migration into 
urban areas, all of which have the potential to pose problems for China’s development. 
Although the Chinese government seeks to absorb surplus labor in the countryside by 
developing rural industries, the government still has to make a tradeoff between these 
two opposing goals.  
 
There are also some other relative studies on regional specialization, though not 
specifically about agricultural production in China. Bai, Du, Tao and Tong (2004) use a 
dynamic panel estimation method to investigate the determinants of regional 
specialization in China’s industries. Less geographic concentration is found in 
industries where the past tax-plus-profit margins and the shares of state ownership are 
high, reflecting stronger local government protection of these industries. The evidence 
also supports the scale-economies theory of regional specialization. Finally, the overall 
time trend of regional specialization of China’s industries is found to have reversed an 
early drop in the mid-1980s, and registered a significant increase in the later years. Kim 
(1995) and Kim (1999) study the trends in U.S. regional manufacturing structure from 
late 1800’s to 1987. The author finds the index of regional specialization in U.S. 
manufacturing industries to be over 0.8 in 1880, but only about 0.6 in 1987. It is 
concluded that factor endowments explain a large amount of the geographic variation, 
and that the historical trends in U.S. regional specialization can be explained jointly by 
models based on scale economies and resources. In addition, David and Weinstein 
(1999) empirically compare the relative importance of comparative advantage and 
increasing returns to scale on regional specialization with Japanese data, and find 
support for the existence of economic geography effects in eight of nineteen 
manufacturing sectors. Although there are differences between agriculture and other 
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industries, these papers provide guidelines on how to and where to look for 
determinants of the trends in regional specialization. 
 
This paper tends to answer the following questions. What is the trend of regional 
specialization of agricultural production in China? What are the key factors that 
determine this trend? What is the effect of WTO membership to the regional 
specialization? It proceeds as follows: Section II discusses important changes within 
China during the studied period; Section III presents preliminary results based on 
available data, which enable us to identify the trend and eyeball the impact of WTO 
membership on agricultural production structure in China; finally in section IV, 
regressions are run on a modified form of Heckscher-Olin Model to test the effect of 
resource and scale, and also to test the effect of WTO membership.  
II. Analysis of the Changes 
In this section, we will discuss the important policy changes during the studied period 
that may have had an effect on the degree of regional specialization in China’s 
agricultural production. Our analysis will be roughly divided into three periods: 1980’s, 
1990-2000 and post 2001. 
2.1 1980’s 
Before the economic reform of China in 1978, Chinese leaders implemented a central 
planning policy, in the belief that markets should play a minimal role. A large portion 
of trade was carried out through state channels in accordance with economic plans. 
Starting from 1978, policies were shifted to encourage markets to develop together 
with state-planned commerce. As a result, a mixed system of trade emerged. In 
agriculture, state planned quotas of agricultural products, which were to be delivered 
to the state, were gradually reduced during the period of 1978 to 1985 for most 
products. Local and long-distance market exchanges were allowed and even 
encouraged to develop. Negotiable state trade was introduced and expanded. However, 
various problems accompanied the early stage of economic reform.  
In Sicular (1988), four major problems were mentioned. First, the higher profitability 
encouraged evasion of remaining quotas. Second, the existing procurement system 
was ill suited to handle emerging agricultural surpluses. Third, growth in production 
led to increasing selectivity of demand. Finally, the procurement system created 
inequities.  
 
In order to deal with these problems, the Chinese government carried out further 
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commercial reforms in 1985. Except for a few products, procurement quotas were no 
longer sent down to farmers. The state no longer promised to buy as much as farmers 
wished to sell. Planned procurement of most agricultural products was gradually 
eliminated and replaced by free-market allocation. All the policies above indicate a 
gradual move towards deregulation over the agricultural trade market, a trend 
generally regarded as helpful to establishing a freer environment for agricultural trade. 
 
On the other hand, the total investment in farming and rural development was 
decreased during this period. The three major components of the total investment 
were state investment, private investment and collective investment. State agricultural 
investment fell continuously after 1979. According to Lardy (1986), it dropped to only 
5% of the state investment in 1984, which was the lowest in the entire history of post 
1949 China. Most of the rural areas did not receive allocation of agricultural products. 
The only rural areas which did receive were primarily those well suited for production 
of commercial crops. Although state agricultural policy sought to compensate for the 
decrease of state investment by encouraging private farm investment, it turned out 
that people were far less willing to invest in farming than expected. Evidence shows 
that they invested in private housing three times as much as in farming. The reason 
might be that, private housing was the only asset whose ownership would not alter 
very often at the time. Moreover, as the level of decollectivization increased during 
the economic reform, collective investment in agriculture also decreased. Lardy (1986) 
says that collective investment in agriculture decreased from 8.7 billion in 1980 to 
only 4.39 billion in 1983.  
 
Another very important factor was the change in policy that accompanied the 
development of the transportation system in China. Since the late 1970’s, 
transportation development was a major focus of the Chinese government. 
Unfortunately, rural areas did not see much benefit, because transportation 
development during that period was concentrated on railways rather than the roads. At 
that time, the role of the transportation sector was not to serve the entire economy, but 
only to serve “heavy industries” (Lyons 1985). Figure 1 shows the development of 
railroads and roads in China from 1962 to 2006. In the figure, there is an obvious slow 
down of road development starting from the late 1970s. It was almost at the same time, 
when China started to direct more effort towards electrified railways. By the time of 
middle 1980’s, there were still no roads passing through one third of China’s villages. 
The nonparallel development of the transportation industry with agriculture greatly 
slowed down the increase of mobility of agricultural input factors and outputs. As a 
result, regions could not rely on the supply from others to satisfy their own needs, but 
had to try to produce a large part of their own demand for most agricultural products. 
 
 Figure 1. Road an Railway Development in China
For road and railway, the figure indicates the index
1962 being 1 for both. For highway and electrified railway, the figure indicates the real 
number of mileage in each year, with the unit being 10,000 kilometers. Road is the total of 
highway and local roads, whi
(Source of data: Statistic Yearbook of China, 2007)
 
Finally, “self-sufficiency” was the policy of pre
all kinds of production. By the mid 1960s, China b
develop duplicate sets of industries in each region and province, so as to be better able 
to sustain economic activity in the event of a foreign invasion (Young 2000).  
Although there was much less emphasis on this policy after 
time for both the administration and production sector to get used of it. The period 
preceding the reform, when local officials were gradually freed from the central 
government, saw new and costly distortions that were created by l
reasons of rent-seeking. According to Young (2000), such distortions included barriers 
to trade such as tariff barriers, physical barriers, outright prohibition, low interest 
loans, or even subversion of the legal system. 
2.2 1990-2000 
The change in China’s agricultural policy in 
two periods: more free trade in early 1990s and more government intervention in mid 
and late 1990s.  
 
Following the pace of reform in 1980s, 
liberalized and grew rapidly in
 
 of length in each year, with the mileages in 
le railway includes both electrified and non-electrified railways.
 
-reform Chinese government in almost 
egan a conscious attempt to 
1978, it would take some 
ocal officials for 
 
the 1990s can be roughly divided in to 
the agricultural market became more 




government abandoned the urban grain rationing system and stopped the fixed price 
for contracted government purchases. Although famers still needed to sell to the 
government a certain amount of their products, the prices were to be determined at the 
market level. By this time, China’s agricultural market had reached the most 
flourishing point they had ever been since 
economy started to suffer from another round of inflation, which increased expected 
prices in the future. As farmers were much more free to make their own production 
decisions, many of them decided to withhold their production in the fall and winter of 
1993-1994, in order to get the highest expected price in the future. Not only individual 
farmers but also local governments in surplus areas implemented prohibition
outward shipment, for the purpose of maximizing revenue. All these contributed to a 
sharp increase in agricultu
 
 Figure 2. Price Indexes for Agricultural Products Purchase Price in China
The figure indicates purchase price indexes for agricultural products in China, with that in the 
year of 1979 being 1. (Source: USDA Economic Research Services, China Agricultural and 
Economy data, National Data Results)
 
Viewing the price increase in 1993 and production decrease in late 1994, the Chinese 
government considered them to be a signal for the need of more 
intervention. According to Carter (1997), policies were introduced during late 1994 and 
1995 to reduce the importance of 
government agencies were again prohibited to buy grain directly from th
especially before government quotas were fulfilled. Second, 
established a blockade on rice and corn exports. Third and most importantly, the 
Governors Green Bag Responsibility System policy was implemented, which required 
provincial governors to be responsible for grain supply in each province regardless of 
comparative advantage in grain production. Based on 1995, 1996 and preliminary 1997 
the 1950’s. However, the country’s 
ral products prices, which can be seen in figure 2. 
 
government
the market in agricultural product trade. First, non 
e farmers, 









data, Crook (1997) examined the effect of these policies and argued that the grain bag 
responsibility system was effective to the central government of China, because it 
raised the sown area in most provinces, increased production and reduced imports. This 
can explain the decrease of price in the late 1990s in figure 2, and the reason for the 
Chinese government to maintain this policy until the end of the twentieth century. 
However, these policies have a negative impact on geographic concentration of 
agricultural production in China.  
 
Conversely, the development of transportation sector became faster and more 
balanced in the 1990s, as shown in figure 1. A highway system emerged in China by 
the end of the 1980s and expanded rapidly during the following decade, especially in 
the late 1990s. Although the total length of railway did not increase much during this 
period, the portion of electrified railway increased tremendously. During the same 
period, the aviation sector matured and became another major part in transportation. 
The total length of civil aviation routes in China increased from 506.8 thousand 
kilometers in 1990 to 1522.2 thousand kilometers in 1999, and  more than tripled.  
2.3 Post 2001 
Important agricultural policy changes in China after 2000 were mostly due to the 
accession of the WTO in December 2001. In entering the WTO, China had to show to 
the world its willingness to be more open to international trade and to continue its 
drive for domestic reform. Even before China’s accession to the WTO, many 
economists predicted that China’s agricultural sector would struggle to survive when 
exposed to the world market, because it was considered to be the most vulnerable 
segment of China’s economy. Therefore, China’s policy changes after 2000 were not 
only aimed to fulfill its WTO commitments, but also to prevent its agricultural sector 
from being destroyed. Such policy changes can be differentiated into two areas: 
international trade policy changes and domestic agricultural policy changes.  
 
The initial international trade policy changes were aimed at reducing trade barriers 
and discrimination against imports, as well as increasing the transparency of trade. To 
some extent, China liberalized agricultural trade. Table 1 shows the tariff rates and 
quota levels for tariff rate quota (TRQ) commodities1. Products listed in table 1 are 
major commodities in China’s international agricultural trade. It is clear that for all of 
these commodities, in-quota tariff rates were far below that in 2001. Out-quota tariff 
rates were all decreased or expected to decrease in the future. The quota level for each 
commodity was increased immediately and continuously after 2001. China also  
                                                             
1
 Source: Fuller, F., J. Beghin, et al. (2003). "China's Accession to the World Trade Organization: What Is at Stake 
for Agricultural Markets?" Review of Agricultural Economics 25(2): 399-414. 
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Table 1   Tariff rates and quota levels for TRQ commodities (percent)   2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2010/11 
Wheat       
   Baseline 2001 14.13 14.13 14.13 14.13 14.13 14.13 
   Scenario in-quota tariff 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
   Scenario out-quota tariff 76.00  74.00  72.00  68.00  65.00  65.00  
   Scenario quota (mmt) 8.47  9.05  9.64  9.64  9.64  9.64  
Corn       
   Baseline 2001 14.13 14.13 14.13 14.13 14.13 14.13 
   Scenario in-quota tariff 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
   Scenario out-quota tariff 76.00  74.00  72.00  68.00  65.00  65.00  
   Scenario quota(mmt) 5.85  6.53  7.20  7.20  7.20  7.20  
Rice       
   Baseline 2001 14.13 14.13 14.13 14.13 14.13 14.13 
   Scenario in-quota tariff 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
   Scenario out-quota tariff 76.00  74.00  72.00  68.00  65.00  65.00  
   Scenario quota(mmt) 3.99  4.66  5.32  5.32  5.32  5.32  
Cotton       
   Baseline 2001 3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  
   Scenario in-quota tariff 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
   Scenario out-quota tariff 76.00  67.00  58.00  49.00  40.00  40.00  
   Scenario quota(mmt) 0.82  0.86  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.89  
Soybean Oil       
   Baseline 2001 13.00  13.00  13.00  13.00  13.00  13.00  
   Scenario in-quota tariff 9.00  9.00  9.00  9.00  9.00  9.00  
   Scenario out-quota tariff 74.00  74.00  74.00  74.00  74.00  9.00  
   Scenario quota (mmt) 2.52  2.82  3.12  3.59  3.59  no TRQ 
Rapeseed Oil       
   Baseline 2001 20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  
   Scenario in-quota tariff 9.00  9.00  9.00  9.00  9.00  9.00  
   Scenario out-quota tariff 74.00  74.00  74.00  74.00  74.00  9.00  
   Scenario quota (mmt) 0.88  1.02  1.13  1.24  1.13  no TRQ 
Source: Fuller, F., J. Beghin, et al. (2003). "China's Accession to the World Trade Organization: 
What Is at Stake for Agricultural Markets?" Review of Agricultural Economics 25(2): 399-414. 
 
granted “zero tariff” status for some foreign agricultural products, announcing certain 
agricultural products imported from these countries would enjoy zero tariffs in China 
after a certain time. Moreover, China introduced private trading quotas to break the 
monopoly of the state trading companies. All these policy changes were supposed to 
liberalize China’s agricultural trade market. 
 
But in reality, these policy changes were not as effective as expected in introducing 
free trade. As we mentioned above, China’s agricultural sector was still in need of 
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protection. First, also from table 1 we can see that, although out-quota tariff rates 
were decreasing, the rate level was incomparably high, some even more that 20 times 
higher than in 2001. It shot up the price of out-quota imports, and dramatically 
reduced their competitiveness in China’s domestic market. Second, the “zero tariff” 
status was only granted to a few countries whose trade with China consisted of only a 
tiny part of China’s total agricultural trade. For example, according to Han (2005), 
China signed such a protocol with Cambodia, Laos and Burma in 2002, but the 
overall value of China’s trade with them was less than one billion U.S. dollars per 
year, compared with $621 billion of its total international trade in 2002. Finally, a 
large part of China’s private trading quota was still held by state companies. Due 
these circumstances, the pace of China’s development towards freer trade was slower 
than expected.  
 
Many domestic agricultural policies also changed after 2001. First, China increased 
government budgetary expenditure for agriculture. Agriculture was identified as a 
priority sector for the first time in the last decade in 2002. In practice, the 
governments of 29 provinces made direct payments to grain producers for a total of 
11.6 billion yuan in 2004. Second, by May 2004, all 31 provinces of China had 
implemented a reform of rural taxation. The core of the reforms was: (1) removing of 
fees and funds that used to be collected from the farmers; (2) adjustment of taxes in 
order to prohibit duplication; (3) reform of collection and use of village levies. It was 
claimed that the tax burden of peasants was decreased by 30%-80% by the reforms 
(Han 2005). In addition, other related reforms were carried out to render the rural 
taxation reform sustainable, such as the reform to reduce bureaucracy and enhance 
accountability for rural governance, the reform to redefine the role and responsibility 
of each level of government, and the increase in transfer payments from the upper 
level government to support lower-level rural taxation reform.  
III. Data and Preliminary Results 
The empirical analysis in this paper relies solely on the data of twenty major 
agricultural products in China, which are apple, banana, beef, cigarette, corn, cotton, 
egg, fresh water products, grape, milk, mutton, orange, pear, pork, rapeseed, rice, salt 
water products, soybeans, tea and wheat. Monthly provincial quantity of production 
data and price index data of each product is drawn from statistical yearbooks published 
by the National Bureau of Statistics of China2. National average prices for each product 
in 2006 are from the 2007 statistical yearbook. National average prices of each product 
in 1985-2005 are calculated using the prices in 2006 and the price indices. For the 
                                                             
2
 Statistical yearbooks of China from 1986 to 2007. The data set includes all 31 provinces in mainland China.  
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regression in section IV, annual provincial data of sown area, employment in 
agricultural production, total machinery power, precipitation, temporary, highway and 
railway mileage are also drawn from statistical yearbooks of China.  
 
It is true that this is not a perfect data set. First, our results could be more accurate if we 
had a record of the prices for each product in each year, rather than calculating with 
indices. Second, provincial price data, rather than national average price data, would 
also be a big improvement. Unfortunately, these short comings are due to the 
unavailability of data. However, considering the assumption in trade theories that prices 
are equalized in free trade, the national average prices may not be that bad. Also, as we 
are more interested in the trends rather than the exact degree of regional specialization, 
the bias from using this data will not cause significant deviation from the overall 
picture.  
 
Following general practice, the thirty-one provinces in mainland China are aggregated 
into six different regions3: northeast (NE), north (N), northwest (NW), east (E), center 
(C) and south (S). This regionalization is the same as that used by Carter and Lohmar 
(2002), which was also used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s “Economic 
Research Service in the China” component of its baseline model (used to predict 
agricultural production, consumption, and trade). These six regions represent separate 
agro-climatic regions. 
 
According to Krugman, an index valuing between zero and two can be calculated to 
measure the degree of regional specialization. The closer the index is to two, the more 
divergently specialized the two regions are; the closer it is to zero, the more similar the 
two regions are. Following Krugman, the equation for calculating the index is: 
RI =  V







where, Vij is the value of production in the agricultural sector i for region j, Vj is the 
total value of agricultural production for region j, and similarly for Vik and Vk. RIjk 
measures the index of specialization of region j with respect to region k. The aggregate 
level of specialization in a country is then the unweighted average of the two-region 
indices for all pair wise combinations of regions. For the case of China, there are six 
regions, so 15 different pair wise combinations.  
                                                             
3
 The provinces are aggregated into the six regions as follows: NE includes Heilongjiang, Liaoning and Jilin 
provinces; N includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Shandong and Henan provinces; NW includes Inner Mongolia, 
Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Qinghai, and Tibet; E includes, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui; C 
includes Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, and Chongqing; and S includes Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, 
Guizhou, and Yunnan.  
 
Applying this method to our data set
China’s agricultural production
3 shows the trend of shift in the structure of regional production. 
report the digital results for
1990, 1995, 2000 and 2006. 
 
Figure 3. Index of Regional Specialization, 1985
 
From figure 3 we can see that, there seems to be a trend of despecialization in China 
from late 1980s till mid 1990s, followed by a series of upward movements 
which brought the degree of regional specialization up to 0.94. There is also a very 
obvious upward jump from 2000 to 2001, when China entered WTO. This may be a 
good evidence to support the prediction in Carter and Lohmar (2002), that WTO 
membership has a strong effect. 
 
From table 2 to 6, there are obvious patterns of the change of indices. In the same year, 
the two-region indices vary a lot. For example, the indices range from 0.50 to 1.51 in 
2006, and from 0.41 to 1.35 in 1985. Across the y
magnitudes of the two-region indices are somewhat constant. For instance, the indices 
between South and Northwest are always the largest among the fifteen pair wise 
combinations, while those between South and East are u
 
Table 2  Index of Regional Specialization, 1985
1985 
, aggregate indices of regional specialization for 
 are calculated for each year from 1985 to 2006. 
Table 2 through table 




ears from 1985 to 2006, the relative 
sually the smallest. 
 









NE 0.70  0.85  0.84  1.09  0.96  
N - 0.42  1.02  1.28  1.19  
NW - - 1.09  1.20  1.35  
E - - - 0.43  0.36  
C - - - - 0.41  
      
Average 0.88          
 
 
Table 3  Index of Regional Specialization, 1990 
1990 N NW E C S 
NE 0.66  0.86  0.85  1.16  0.95  
N - 0.42  0.90  1.25  1.09  
NW - - 1.12  1.23  1.36  
E - - - 0.47  0.37  
C - - - - 0.52  
      
Average 0.88          
 
 
Table 4   Index of Regional Specialization, 1995 
1995 N NW E C S 
NE 0.57  0.82  0.79  1.14  0.88  
N - 0.45  0.87  1.23  1.05  
NW - - 1.14  1.23  1.36  
E - - - 0.56  0.36  
C - - - - 0.63  
      
Average 0.87          
 
 
Table 5   Index of Regional Specialization, 2000 
2000 N NW E C S 
NE 0.55  0.90  0.54  1.05  0.64  
N - 0.67  0.76  1.20  0.91  
NW - - 1.18  1.21  1.38  
E - - - 0.66  0.45  
C - - - - 0.87  
      
Average 0.86          
 
 
Table 6   Index of Regional Specialization, 2006 
2006 N NW E C S 
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NE 0.60  1.02  0.67  1.10  0.77  
N - 0.79  0.83  1.19  0.98  
NW - - 1.30  1.38  1.51  
E - - - 0.63  0.50  
C - - - - 0.86  
      




Average Regional Specialization in South and North   1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 
South 0.40 0.45 0.51 0.66 0.66 
North 0.66 0.65 0.61 0.7 0.8 
Across North 
and South 1.11 1.1 1.08 0.98 1.08 
 
If we further aggregate the six regions into two parts of China: northern part of China, 
which includes north, northeast and northwest, and southern part of China, which 
includes east, center and south, it is interesting to see that the degree of specialization is 
relatively lower within each of the two parts and larger across them, which can be seen 
more clearly from table 7. This means agricultural production in China is more 
differentiated between the northern and southern part. Also, it is noticeable that the 
average degree of specialization in the south is always lower than in the north. This tells 
us that the degree of similarity among the regions in southern part of China is higher 
than that in northern part. These results are reasonable considering the real situation in 
China. First, northern China differs from the south in many aspects, including capital, 
human and natural resources. Secondly, regions in south China are more equalized in 
economic development, and have more similar natural conditions. Some of the 
descriptive information is shown in table 8.  
 
The net import and export data of China in 2006 allocates the twenty agricultural 
products into three groups: exportable, importable and non-tradable goods. Exportable 
goods include eleven products, which are apple, beef, cigarette, corn, eggs, fresh water 
product, orange, pork, rice, salt water product and tea. Importable goods are cotton, 
soybean and wheat. The remaining products are classified as non- tradable. The net 
export value of the exportable goods was 7.32 billion US dollars, while the  
Table 8    
Natural, Capital and Human Resource in Each Region for Selected Years 
    
1985 
Temperature ( ) 
Precipitation (1000mm) 







Temperature ( ) 
Precipitation (1000mm) 







Temperature ( ) 
Precipitation (1000mm) 





Annual data for each region from 1985 to 2006 is used in the regression. 
 
net import value of the importable goods was 12.31 billion US dollars in 2006. 
Following the above definition, the portions of 
in each region in each year are calculated and shown in table 9. The percentages range 
from 0.51 to 0.97, with the south region producing the most and the northwest region 






North China South China
N NW NE C E 
     
12.12 8.19 5.37 16.53 15.63
3.73 2.71 2.38 5.7 4.97
73.84 26.41 15.91 84.74 48.97
 0.49 0.65 1.03 0.39 0.45
 0.99 0.8 1.42 0.39 0.73
156.9 174.99 102.76 222.24 74.92
10.18 11.74 12.04 8.18 3.34
     
     
13.29 8.87 6.53 17.31 16.55
3.33 2.66 1.8 6.42 4.74
78.54 30.13 17.66 86.74 47.4
 0.47 0.6 0.92 0.39 0.44
 1.76 1.19 1.64 0.57 1.24
205.28 197.92 123.57 243.49 99.06
11.37 12.5 11.99 8.45 3.7
     
     
14.02 9.7 6.73 18.3 17.5
2.91 2.06 1.7 5.47 4.41
75.02 29.39 18.85 70.98 36.71
 0.53 0.68 1.04 0.49 0.58
 4.12 2.55 3.25 1.59 2.85
729.78 593.89 321.57 746.86 380.29
17.17 17.76 13.41 12.1 5.59
 


































Within this section, data will be applied to a modified Heckscher-Ohlin model to 
estimate the determinants of the trend of regional specialization in agricultural 
production of China.  
 
Table 9   Percentage of Exportable Goods Produced in Each Region 
Year NE N NW E C S 
1985 0.81 0.62 0.51 0.82 0.90 0.97 
1986 0.82 0.62 0.51 0.83 0.91 0.96 
1987 0.84 0.66 0.55 0.84 0.91 0.96 
1988 0.86 0.70 0.56 0.86 0.93 0.96 
1989 0.85 0.69 0.55 0.86 0.93 0.97 
1990 0.86 0.70 0.55 0.86 0.92 0.97 
1991 0.86 0.70 0.56 0.87 0.91 0.96 
1992 0.85 0.73 0.57 0.85 0.91 0.96 
1993 0.85 0.76 0.58 0.87 0.92 0.97 
1994 0.87 0.76 0.60 0.87 0.92 0.97 
1995 0.89 0.76 0.61 0.87 0.92 0.97 
1996 0.89 0.78 0.62 0.87 0.92 0.97 
1997 0.87 0.76 0.59 0.86 0.91 0.97 
1998 0.90 0.79 0.60 0.89 0.92 0.97 
1999 0.91 0.79 0.62 0.87 0.92 0.97 
2000 0.89 0.81 0.61 0.89 0.92 0.97 
2001 0.89 0.80 0.60 0.88 0.92 0.97 
2002 0.88 0.80 0.60 0.88 0.93 0.97 
2003 0.86 0.79 0.55 0.87 0.91 0.96 
2004 0.85 0.76 0.54 0.86 0.92 0.96 
2005 0.86 0.78 0.52 0.87 0.93 0.97 
2006 0.86 0.77 0.51 0.87 0.92 0.96 
 
4.1 Model Setup 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that regional specialization is affected by resource 
and scale economy. According to Kim (1995), in a study of the manufacturing industry, 
raw material intensity (cost of raw materials divided by value added) can be used to 
measure the importance of resource, and average plant size by production workers can 
be used as a measure of scale economies.  
 
Because agriculture is different from manufacturing, we modify the model by using 
three categories of variables: scale, natural resources and human investment. 
Specifically, we use sown land per working capital to represent the scale of the 
economy (scale), we use precipitation and temperature to represent the natural resource 
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of a region, and we use per capita power of agricultural machinery in each region4 
(machinery), mileage of road (Road) and railway (Railway) to represent the human 
investment of a region5.  
 
Also, following Kim (1995), regional dummies are included in our model as the 
regional-specific effect. Instead of time dummies, a year series variable is included in 
this model. In order to test the effect of WTO membership, a dummy variable WTO is 
included by interacting with the year variable. The value of the dummy is 0 in the year 
2000 and before, and 1 afterwards. Another important variable in our model is the 
portion of exportable goods produced in each region. Therefore, our econometric 
model is specified as: 
(1)  
  =  ! +  # +  $%ℎ'( +  )' 
+ *%'+' +  ,'- +  .'/( +  0(' 
+ 12(' ∗ 4567 +  8' +  !9:; + < 
All other variables are either self-explanatory or explained above, except that portion 
representing exportable goods produced in a region. North, Northwest, Northeast, 
South and East are regional dummies. 
(2)  
  =  ! +  # +  $ log2%ℎ'(7 
+ )' +  *%'+' +  , log2'-7 
+ . log2'/(7 +  0(' +  12(' ∗ 4567 
+ 8' +  !9:; + < 
Model (2) is a modification of (1) by taking the log of machinery, road and railway. A 
fixed effect model is used on both (1) and (2) to account for effects specific to each 
region, which stays constant over time and for effects specific to each year that stay 
constant for all regions. 
4.2 Hypotheses to Test 
The first job of this model is to identify the determinant factors of regional 
                                                             
4
 Power of agricultural machinery is a statistics in China’s statistic yearbook. It is the sum of the total power of 
major machineries that are used in agricultural production, such as tractors, seeding machines, reaping machines 
and so on. Its unit is kilowatt. 
5
 Unfortunately, not all these data are available for all provinces. By the assumption that provinces within each 
region are similar, we ignore the provinces whose data are unavailable, and use only available data to calculate 
regional averages.  
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specialization in China’s agricultural production. According to our set up, there are 
three groups of factors in the model: natural resource, human investment resource and 
scale. Trade theories predict that at least one of these factors should have a significant 
effect.  
 
Second, we want to test whether WTO membership has an effect on the degree of 
regional specialization. It is generally believed that the WTO makes trade much freer 
within its membership countries. And trade theories always relate the degree of free 
trade to the degree of regional specialization. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that 
there is a strong relationship between WTO membership and the degree of regional 
specialization. Moreover, if there is a significant effect, we want to go one step further 
to do two more tests.  
 
First, when did the effect take place? Was it in, before or after the year when China 
entered the WTO? By doing this test, we will be able to answer the question of whether 
China had effectively prepared for the entering the WTO previous to its entrance. As 
discussed in section 2.2 and 2.3, China made many policy changes before entering the 
WTO, and it is obvious that China was trying to prepare for their entrance. These 
preparations would only be considered effective if they had a similar effect as WTO 
membership. That means, the policy changes before entering the WTO set China more 
in line with what is expected of a WTO member country. On the other hand, if the 
preparations were not effective, it would mean that China only started to change toward 
a WTO member country after its entrance of WTO. In order to do the test, we alter the 
WTO dummy variable to 1_WTO and WTO_1. 1_WTO equals zero on and before 
1999, which means effective preparations if significant. WTO_1 equals zero on and 
before 2001, which means ineffective preparations if significant. Regression results for 
both function forms and all alternatives are shown in tables 10 and 11.  
 
Second, we want to test whether entering the WTO had different effects on regions that 
are producing different portions of exportable goods. Regions producing a larger 
portion of exportable goods have comparative advantage on resources that are intensive 
in producing such goods. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, a country or a 
region exports the goods that they have a comparative advantage on in free trade. As 
discussed in section II, there used to be different sources of trade barriers in China 
before its entrance into the WTO, which prevented each region from making full use of 
their comparative advantage. After 2001 or even earlier, those barriers were gradually 
removed. Trade became freer for each region both inside and outside China, which 
allowed them to make better use of their comparative advantage for revenue 
enhancement. On the other hand, before entering WTO, the major competitors of each 
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region were other regions within China. The central control of the Chinese government 
guaranteed that competition would not escalate to an extent that any region was badly 
hurt. Also, the government was able to apply barriers to protect its agricultural sector 
from the challenges of the world market. After entering the WTO, China entered the 
world market. Each region has to compete not only with other regions in China, but the 
rest of the world, which the Chinese government has very little control over. Therefore, 
regions have to specialize on products that they have comparative advantages on, so as 
to survive. The above discussion means that it is both necessary and sufficient for each 
region to become more specialized after China entering WTO. In order to test the WTO 
effect on regions producing different  
 
Table 10   Estimate Results for the Linear Model     WTO 1_WTO WTO_1 
Scale  0.035 0.046 0.054 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Machinery  0.021 0.020 0.019 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Precipitation  -0.0080 -0.0063 -0.0099 
  (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0067) 
Temperature  -0.0064 -0.00054 -0.0068 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Road  -0.000020 -0.000020 -0.000039 
  (0.000081) (0.000079) (0.000082) 
Railway  -0.0057 -0.0030 0.0011 
  (0.0064) (0.0056) (0.0059) 
Year  0.0035** 0.0021 0.0044*** 
  (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017) 
Year*WTO  0.000029*** 0.000032*** 0.000014 
  (0.000011) (9.0e-6) (0.00001) 
Portion  0.23 0.19 0.15 
  (0.10) (0.19) (0.21) 
Regional Dummies  All positively significant 
     
R-Square  0.93 0.94 0.93 
No. of Observation   132  132  132 
Numbers in parentheses below each estimate is the standard error for that 
estimate. A three star indicates a statistically significant estimate at 1% level. A 
double star indicates a statistically significant estimate at 5% level. A single star 
indicates a statistically significant estimate at 10% level.  
 
Table 11   Estimate Results for the Log Model     WTO 1_WTO WTO_1 
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Scale  0.033 0.057 0.031 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Log(Machinery)  -0.018 -0.034 -0.022 
  (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) 
Precipitation  -0.0083 -0.0061 -0.0087 
  (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0065) 
Temperature  -0.0078 -0.0019 -0.0086 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Log(Road)  0.013 0.012 0.015 
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) 
Log(Railway)  0.16** 0.14** 0.19*** 
  (0.075) (0.063) (0.067) 
Year  0.0032 0.0021 0.0035 
  (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Year*WTO  7.9e-6 0.000023** 1.4e-6 
  (0.000011) (8.9e-6) (9.6e-6) 
Portion  0.25 0.31* 0.22 
  (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
Regional Dummies  All positively significant 
     
R-Square  0.94 0.94 0.94 
No. of Observation   132  132  132 
Numbers in parentheses below each estimate is the standard error for that 
estimate. A three star indicates a statistically significant estimate at 1% level. A 
double star indicates a statistically significant estimate at 5% level. A single star 
indicates a statistically significant estimate at 10% level.  
 
portions of exportable goods, we altered model (1) and (2) by adding an interaction 
term between portion and WTO*year. Regression results for this model are shown in 
table 12. 
4.3 Analysis of Results 
There are four major findings from the regression results:  
 
(a) The scale variable, natural resource variables and Road variable are not significant 
in determining the regional agricultural production structure. The only exceptions may 
be Railway and Machinery, which are both human investment resources.  
 
According to tables 11 and 12, the effects of railway and machinery on regional 
specialization were both positive. More specifically, a one percent railway increase led 
to about 0.16 unit increase in the degree of specialization; a one unit increase in 
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machinery led to a 0.055 unit increase in the degree of specialization. The result means 
that only human investment matters in determining the regional specialization of 
agricultural production in China. 
 
Table 12 
Test for Reaction to WTO membership from Different Regions     (1) (2) 
Scale  -0.10 -0.085 
  (0.11) (0.13) 
Machinery 0.055*** 0.024 
  (0.018) (0.051) 
Precipitation -0.0066 -0.0076 
  (0.0061) (0.0062) 
Temperature -0.0060 -0.012 
  (0.0094) (0.0097) 
Road -0.00012 0.017 
  (0.000077) (0.033) 
Railway 0.0064 0.13* 
  (0.0064) (0.071) 
Year  0.0033** 0.0025 
  (0.0015) (0.0022) 
Year*WTO  -0.00015*** -0.000094*** 
  (0.000037) (0.000029) 
Portion  -0.21 0.095 
  (0.20) (0.18) 
Portion*Year*WTO  0.00019*** 0.00012*** 
  (0.000038) (0.000033) 
Regional Dummies All positively significant, except N 
    
R-Square  0.94 0.94 
No. of Observation  132  132 
Numbers in parentheses below each estimate is the standard error for that 
estimate. A three star indicates a statistically significant estimate at 1% level. A 
double star indicates a statistically significant estimate at 5% level. A single 
star indicates a statistically significant estimate at 10% level. Column (1) 
shows the results for the linear model, while column (2) shows those for the 
log model.  
 
One of the important inferences from this result is that, China’s agricultural production 
has been developed to a relatively higher level. It is generally believed that in less 
agriculturally developed countries, agricultural production should largely depend on 
natural conditions, such as weather and terrain. Although the aim of this paper is not to 
study the productivity of agriculture, the regression results show a decrease in the 
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dependency of agricultural production on weather variables. Instead, we see a 
significantly positive relationship between human investment and production. It tells us 
that the importance of capital is increasing, which is a sign for the development of 
China’s agricultural production. 
 
Another possible explanation of this result may not be as optimistic as the one above. 
Although the economy in China is mostly market oriented today, their infrastructure 
investments, such as the building of railways, are still highly dependent on central 
government policies. Therefore, this result may also be a sign that government policy is 
still a very important factor in determining agricultural production in China. The 
government still has some controlling power over the structure of regional agricultural 
production, intentionally or unintentionally, through the direction of government 
investment. The influence is so strong that people even ignore their regional 
comparative advantage on natural resources and other factors. In the case when all 
policies are appropriate, this would not be a problem, because appropriate policies 
should have already taken every factor into consideration. However, it is usually not the 
case in reality. When policies are biased and production follows the policies so closely, 
production may diverge away from its comparative advantage. As a result, the 
competitiveness of the country in the world would decrease in free trade.  
 
It is most likely that (a) is the result of the combination of the above two reasons. That is, 
agricultural production in China has developed, while it is still under the control of 
government policies to some extent.  
 
(b) The empirical results support the prediction of Carter and Lohmar (2002), that the 
total effect of WTO membership is significantly positive on the regional specialization 
of China’s agricultural production. China’s preparations for entering the WTO were 
effective. 
 
According to Table 10, the index of regional specialization increases by about 0.00003 
a year starting from at least one year before China entering WTO. A Chow test of 
structure break in 2000 rejects the null hypothesis that the parameters are the same 
before and after 2000, which is consistent with our regression result. This result is also 
consistent with theories. Entering the WTO has the effect of freeing trade, which makes 
countries or regions produce according to their comparative advantage.  
 
As a result, countries or regions become specialized on products that they have a 




Also, this result tells us that the policy changes the Chinese government made before 
entering the WTO were effective in reducing trade barriers and freeing trade in 
agricultural products. Unlike many pessimistic predictions, this goal was achieved 
without the agricultural sector being destroyed by free trade. This is useful in providing 
successful examples for other developing countries which share similar situations with 
pre-WTO China and are willing to open their agricultural market to the rest of the 
world.  
 
(c) Regions that produce a larger portion of exportable products become more 
specialized after entering the WTO, than those that produce a smaller portion of 
exportable products.  
 
According to table 12, after entering the WTO, every one percent increase in the 
production of exportable goods would increase the region’s degree of specialization by 
about 0.0002. This result means that all else equal, regions producing a larger portion of 
exportable goods would not only be more specialized, but also become specialized 
faster.  
 
By controlling for the portion of exportable goods in each region, we are able to 
separate the total effect of WTO membership into two parts: the effect on regions with 
different portions of exportable goods and other effects. Tables 10 and 12 show that, 
although the overall effect of WTO membership is positive, its two components have 
different signs. WTO membership increases the degree of specialization for regions 
with higher portions of exportable goods, while the net outcome of all other WTO 
effects is negative. The positive effect is large enough, so that it overcomes all negative 
effects and make the net total effect of WTO membership positive.  
 
According to our previous analysis, regions producing a larger portion of exportable 
goods should have a comparative advantage in producing them. Therefore, this result is 
actually saying that comparative advantage becomes a determinant factor in 
agricultural production after China entered the WTO. Although it is impossible to 
separate important factors of comparative advantage from this result, it shows that 
entering the WTO does have the effect of making a country to produce according to its 
comparative advantage. In combination with result (a), it also tells us that China’s 
agriculture was not producing effectively before entering the WTO.  
 
(d) The center region is the one with the least specialization among all six regions.  
 
This finding is somewhat surprising at first glance. According to table 9, the center 
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region produces the second largest portion of exportable goods among the six regions. 
It means that the center region has a comparative advantage in producing exportable 
goods. Considering result (c), this region should be relatively more specialized, 
especially after 2001. 
 
One possible explanation may be that, the value of per capita power of agricultural 
machinery (Machinery) and the mileage of railway (Railway) are relatively low in this 
region. According to table 8, the mileage of railway in center region always ranked 4th 
among the six regions from 1985 to 2006; while the per capita power of agricultural 
machinery ranked the last most of the time. From result (a), these two factors are the 
only ones that have positively significant effect on regional specialization during the 
whole period of our study, regardless of WTO membership. The estimated parameters 
for these two variables are much larger than that for “Portion*Year*WTO”. Therefore, 
it may be reasonable to argue that, the low level of Machinery and Railway prevented 
the center region from becoming more specialized in the long-run, while the high 
portion of exportable goods production has effect only after China entered the WTO.  
 
A further look into the data may find the large agricultural population to be the primary 
cause. Also from table 8, the agricultural population in the center region is always 
among the top two from 1985 to 2006. Actually, it was only after1999 that the 
agricultural population in the north region exceeded that in center region. The 
agriculture population in center in 2006 is still twice as much as that in northwest and 
east regions, and more than three times that in northeast. Although the total level of 
machinery power in the center region is always far above the national average, 
sometimes even ranking the top among the six regions, the per capita level is almost 
always the lowest, because of its huge agricultural population. In addition, a decreasing 
trend in the agricultural population in the center region can be identified from table 8. 
So, it may be possible that the center region becomes more specialized than others in 
the future.  
 
The location of the center region may also be one of the reasonable explanations for the 
center region being the list specialized, though not the most important one. The center 
region borders on four of the other regions except the northeast, which means it is the 
one that has the most neighbor regions. Therefore, the center region may share some 
characteristics with each of the bordered regions, and consequently, may be  
 
suitable for producing more kinds of agricultural products than any other region. As a 




After 30 years of economic reform, the competitiveness of China in the world 
agricultural market has increased a lot. However, the degree of regional specialization 
in China’s agricultural production did not increase as predicted by many theories. 
Instead, it fluctuated in the last two decades of late 20th century, and only started to 
increase steadily after China entered the WTO. Considering the real situation, 
becoming more specialized may not be the best outcome for China in the early stages of 
economic reform. During the 30 years of this study, China’s economic system changed 
from purely planning, to a mix of planning and market, and finally to a market oriented 
system. China’s agricultural policy varied during this period. Although all these 
policies are aimed at the development of China, they have mixed impacts on the 
geographical concentration of agricultural production.  
 
With a modified Heckscher-Ohlin model, we estimated the determinants of regional 
specialization in China’s agricultural production. Scale and natural resource are found 
to be not significant. Railway and machinery, which are human investment resources, 
are positively significant. It may indicate that agricultural production in China is less 
dependent on natural resources and more dependent on human investment, which 
means a development of agricultural production in China. However, it may also be 
possible that China’s agricultural production is still under the control of the central 
government. WTO membership is found to have a positive total effect on the regional 
structure of agricultural production in China. It is also proved that China effectively 
prepared to enter the WTO beforehand. The total WTO effect can be separated into two 
parts: a large positive effect on regions with higher exportable goods production and a 
negative net effect on all others. The positive WTO effect on regions with higher 
exportable goods production is a signal for the increasing importance of comparative 
advantage. Our regressions also find that the center region is the one with the least 
specialization, which may be a result of large agriculture population in the region 
and/or the location of the region. 
 
The most important limitation in this paper is the lack of a complete data set. The 
results can be greatly improved if we had more years of data, more kinds of agricultural 
products, more detailed provincial data and so on. Most importantly, if we had more 
years of data after 2001, we could have run separate regressions before and after China 
entered WTO, so that we could have found out the determinant variables of 
comparative advantage, as mentioned in result (c). Also, the regression results may be 
sensitive to the aggregation method. If the empirical study was done on provincial level 








Bai, C.-E., Du, Y., Tao, Z., Tong, S. Y., 2004. Local protectionism and regional 
specialization: evidence from China's industries, Journal of International Economics. 
63, 397-417. 
 
Carter, C. A., 1997. The urban-rural income gap in China: Implications for global food 
markets, American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 79, 1410. 
 
Carter, C. A., Lohmar, B., 2002. Regional specialization of China's agricultural 
production, American Journal of Agricultrual Economics, 749-753. 
 
Carter, C. A., Zhong, F.-N., 1991. Will Market Prices Enhance Chinese Agriculture?: A 
Test of Regional Comparative Advantage, Western Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
16, 10. 
 
Chen, X., 2004. China's Agricultural Development and Policy Readjustment after its 
WTO Accession, in S. L. Deepak Bhattasali, Will Martin ed., China and the WTO: 
Accession, Policy Reform, and Poverty Reduction Strategies. World Bank Publications. 
 
Crook, F. W., June 2007. Current Agricultural Policies Highlight Concerns About Food 
Security. Economic Research Service/USDA. 
 
Davis, D. R., Weinstein, D. E., 1999. Economic geography and regional production 
structure: An empirical investigation, European Economic Review. 43, 379-407. 
 
Donglin, H., 2005. Why Has China's Agriculture Survived WTO Accession?, Asian 
Survey. 45, 931-948. 
 
Fuller, F., Beghin, J., Cara, S. D., Fabiosa, J., Fang, C., Matthey, H., 2003. China's 
Accession to the World Trade Organization: What Is at Stake for Agricultural Markets?, 
Review of Agricultural Economics. 25, 399-414. 
 
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Sorensen, B. E., Yosha, O., 2001. Economic Integration, Industrial 
Specialization, and the Asymmetry of Macroeconomic Fluctuations, Journal of 
International Economics. 55, 107-137. 
 
Kim, S., 1995. Expansion of markets and the geographic distribution of economic 
activities: The trends in U.S, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 110, 881-908. 
 
Kim, S., 1999. Regions, resources, and economic geography: Sources of U.S. regional 
comparative advantage, 1880-1987, Regional Science and Urban Economics. 29, 1-32. 
 
Kym Anderson, W. M. a. E. V., 2007. Long Run Implications of WTO Accession for 
27 
 
Agriculture in China. IATRC Conference on China and the WTO, Beijing. 
 
Lardy, N. R., 1986. Prospects and Some Policy Problems of Agricultural Development 
in China, American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 68, 451-457. 
 
Li, X.-M., 2000. The Great Leap Forward, Economic Reforms, and the Unit Root 
Hypothesis: Testing for Breaking Trend Functions in China's GDP Data, Journal of 
Comparative Economics. 28, 814-827. 
 
Lin, J. Y., 1992. Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China, The American 
Economic Review. 82, 34-51. 
 
Lohmar, B., 2002. Market Reforms and Policy Initiatives: Rapid Growth and Food 
Security in China, Food Security Assessment/GFA-13. ERS/USDA. 
 
Lyons, T. P., 1985. Transportation in Chinese Development, 1952-1982, The Journal 
of Developing Areas. 19, 305-328. 
 
Malmberg, A., Maskell, P., 1997. Towards an explanation of regional specialization 
and industry agglomeration, European Planning Studies. 5, 25. 
 
Niu, R., Calkins, P. H., 1986. Towards an Agricultural Economy for China in a New 
Age: Progress, Problems, Response, and Prospects, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 68, 445-450. 
 
Norman, V.D., & Venables, A.J. (1995). International Trade, Factor Mobility, and 
Trade Costs. The Economic Journal, 105(433), 1488-1504. 
 
Pingali, P. L., Rosegrant, M. W., 1995. Agricultural Commercialization and 
Diversification - Processes and Policies, Food Policy. 20, 171-185. 
 
Satapathy, C., 2002. China's Membership of WTO: A Few Impressions, Economic and 
Political Weekly. 37, 2208-2210. 
 
Schweinberger, A.G. (1975). The Heckscher-Ohlin Model and Traded Intermediate 
Products. The Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 269-278. 
 
Sicular, T., 1988. Plan and Market in China's Agricultural Commerce, Journal of 
Political Economy. 96, 283. 
 
Xiaobo, Z., Li, X., Shenggen, F., Xiaopeng, L., 2008. Resource abundance and regional 
development in China, Economics of Transition. 16, 7-29. 
Ying, L. G., 1999. China's Changing Regional Disparities during the Reform Period, 




Young, A., 2000. The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the 
People's Republic of China, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 115, 1091-1135. 
 
Yu, W., Frandsen, S. E., 2005. China's WTO Commitments in Agriculture and Impacts 
of Potential OECD Agricultural Trade Liberalizations, Asian Economic Journal. 19, 
1-28. 
 
